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ABSTRACT: In her book Abductive Reasoning Atocha Aliseda (2006) stresses the attention to the logical models of abduction, 
centering on the semantic tableaux as a method for extending and improving both the whole cognitive/philosophical 
view on it and on other more restricted logical approaches. I will provide further insight on two aspects. The first is re-
lated to the importance of increasing logical knowledge on abduction: Aliseda clearly shows how the logical study on 
abduction in turn helps us to extend and modernize the classical and received idea of logic. The second refers to some 
ideas coming from the so-called distributed cognition and concerns the role of logical models as forms of cognitive exter-
nalizations of preexistent in-formal human reasoning performances. The logical externalization in objective systems, 
communicable and sharable, is able to grant stable perspectives endowed with symbolic, abstract, and rigorous cogni-
tive features. I will also emphasize that Aliseda especially stresses that this character of stability and objectivity of logical 
achievements are not usually present in models of abduction that are merely cognitive and epistemological, and of ex-
treme importance from the computational point of view. 
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1. Introduction 
In her book Abductive Reasoning Atocha Aliseda (2006) stresses the attention to the 
logical models of abduction, centering on the semantic tableaux as a method for ex-
tending and improving both the whole cognitive/philosophical view on abduction and 
on other more restricted logical approaches. I think the book wonderfully achieves 
many results. Logic is definitely offered to the appreciation of an interdisciplinary 
cognitive audience in both its plasticity and rigor in modeling various kinds of reason-
ing, beyond the rigid character of many of the traditional perspectives. 
I would like to provide further insight on two aspects. The first is related to the 
importance of increasing logical knowledge on abduction: Aliseda clearly shows how 
the logical study on abduction in turn helps us to extend and modernize the classical 
and received idea of logic. The second refers to some issues coming from the so-called 
distributed cognition approach and concerns the role of logical models as forms of cogni-
tive externalizations of preexistent in-formal human reasoning performances. The 
logical externalization in objective systems, communicable and sharable, is able to 
grant stable perspectives endowed with symbolic, abstract, and rigorous cognitive 
features. Indeed, Aliseda says, this character of stability and objectivity of the logical 
achievements is not usually present in models of abduction that are merely cognitive 
and epistemological and, moreover, they are central to computational implementation.  
As I described about six years ago in my book Abduction, Reason, and Science (Mag-
nani, 2001) Peirce clearly indicated the importance of logic (first order syllogism) to 
grasp the inferential status of abduction, also creating a wonderful new broad semiotic 
view at the same accompanied by the well-known philosophical commitment to the 
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new vision on pragmatism.1 Given the restricted scope —classical, in terms of first 
order syllogisms— of the logical tools that were available to him the logical frame-
work just depicted abduction as the well-known “fallacy of affirming the conse-
quence”. Aliseda’s book belongs to this fundamental Peircian “logical” tradition: it 
presents a plenty of recent logical models of abduction which are clearly illustrated in 
their rigorous “demonstrative” frameworks. 
2. Model-based reasoning in demonstrative frameworks 
It is well-known that the kind of reasoned inference that is involved in selective and creative 
abduction2 goes beyond the mere relationship that there is between premises and conclu-
sions in valid “classical” deductions, where the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of 
the conclusions, but also beyond the relationship that there is in probabilistic reasoning, 
which renders the conclusion just more or less probable.  
On the contrary, we can see selective and creative abduction as formed by the ap-
plication of “heuristic procedures” that involve all kinds of good and bad inferential 
actions, and not only the mechanical application of rules. It is only by means of these 
heuristic procedures that the acquisition of new truths is guaranteed. Also Peirce’s ma-
ture view on creative abduction as a kind of “inference” seems to stress the strategic 
component of reasoning. 
Many researchers in the field of philosophy, logic, and cognitive science have sus-
tained that also deductive reasoning consists in the employment of logical rules in a 
heuristic manner, even maintaining the truth preserving character: the application of 
the rules is organized in a way that is able to recommend a particular course of actions 
instead of another one. Moreover, very often the heuristic procedures of deductive 
reasoning are in turn performed by means of an “in-formal” model-based abduction.3 So 
humans apply rudimentary abductive/strategic ways of reasoning in deduction too. A most 
common example of strategic process that leads to the formation of new hypotheses (crea-
tive abduction) is the usual experience people have of solving problems in geometry in a 
model-based way trying to devise proofs using diagrams and illustrations: of course the at-
tribute of creativity we give the abduction in this case does not mean that it has never been 
made before by anyone or that it is original in the history of some knowledge (in this particu-
lar case the ancient Greek geometers were the “real” creative abducers!). 
 Hence, we have to say that a kind of “in-formal” model-based abductions also 
operate in deductive reasoning performed by human who use logical systems. Follo-
                                                     
1 Aliseda (2006) clearly shows in chapter seven how abduction is at the basis of Peirce’s pragmatism.  
2 Epistemologically selective abduction occurs when we reach a hypothesis among – to use a word of the 
logical tradition also exploited by Aliseda —already available “abducibles” hypotheses (like for in-
stance in the case of medical diagnosis). Creative abduction occurs when, through our reasoning 
processes, we are able to create “new” abducibles, which can be tested and added to [or which can 
replace] the available ones (Magnani, 2001). 
3 In general model-based abduction takes advantage of internal (or of external models suitably re-
internalized) that are not merely symbolic/propositional but which exploit for example diagrams, 
visualization, configurations, schemes, thought experiments, and so on (Magnani, 2001). 
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wing Hintikka and Remes’s analysis (1974) proofs of general implication in first order 
logic need the use of instantiation rules by which “new” individuals are introduced, so 
they are “ampliative”. In ordinary geometrical proofs auxiliary constructions are pre-
sent in term of “conveniently chosen” figures and diagrams. In Beth’s method of se-
mantic tableaux the “strategic ability” performed by humans to construct impossible 
configurations is undeniable (Hintikka, 1998; Niiniluoto, 1999). Also Aliseda provides 
interesting uses of the semantic tableaux as constructive representations of theories, 
where for example, abductive expansions and revisions, derived from the belief revi-
sion framework, operate over them. In the case of tableaux, their symbolic character is 
certainly fundamental, but it is also particularly clear they also are configurations —
model-based— of proofs externalized through suitable notations.4  
 Following Hintikka, we can say that the “ground floor” of deductive reasoning, the 
first-order logic, is nothing but operating with certain models or approximations of 
models, as is just simply demonstrated by some fundamental techniques such as 
Beth’s semantic tableaux. It is important to note that Hintikka is perfectly aware of the 
double character of these “models”, internal and/or external:  
These models can be thought of as being mental, or they can be taken to consist of sets of for-
mulas on paper —or in this day and age perhaps rather on the screen and in the memory of a 
computer. In fact, from this perspective all rules of “logical inference” obviously involve “mental 
models”. Johnson-Laird’s discovery hence does not ultimately pertain to the psychology of logic. 
It pertains, however confusedly, to the nature of logic itself. The most basic deductive logic is nothing 
but experimental model construction. (Hintikka, 1997, pp. 69-70) 
 In this way Hintikka rejoins the distributed cognition approach to logic I have also 
stressed in Magnani (2005), where the interplay between internal and external (as kinds 
of “semiotic anchors” —symbolic, in this case, Magnani 2006b) aspects of logical rea-
soning are illustrated. For example the role in logical deduction of the strategies of 
experimental (counter) model-construction is stressed, but also the importance of the 
introduction of the right new individuals by means of existential instantiation to be 
introduced in the model. The most important “strategic” question —in deductive 
reasoning— is to determine in what order the instantiations are to be treated. In geo-
metrical reasoning the role of existential instantiation is obvious and occurs through 
the iconic so-called “auxiliary constructions”, where conceptually manipulating a con-
figuration of geometrical objects and extending it by introducing new individuals is at 
stake. The possible creative character is for example reflected in the fact that there is 
not always a mechanical (recursive) method for modeling these human deductive per-
formances. Of course, as Aliseda shows in chapter four “Abduction as computation”, 
a suitable computational counterpart can take advantage of algorithms which render 
mechanical the suitably chosen reasoning processes, and so suitable to be imple-
mented in a computational program. 
                                                     
4 It is worth to be noted that semantic tableaux method provides further insight on the problem of theory 
evaluation, intrinsic in abductive reasoning. In chapters six and eight, Aliseda shows how semantic 
tableaux can deal with “causal” aspects of abductive reasoning that cannot be considered with the 
only help of the logic programming tradition. 
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The logical tradition of Frege and Russell rejected all reasoning that had been made in 
terms of geometrical icons as being responsible for introducing an appeal to intuition. On 
the contrary, I am very inclined to agree with Hintikka, who maintains that the traditional 
idea of logical reasoning as a discursive process is wrong, it is an “optical illusion”, because all 
deduction is a form of “experimental model construction” that follows that interplay be-
tween internal and external representations I have already indicated. It is important instead to 
note that for instance already at the level of elementary geometry:  
[…] geometrical figures are best thought of as a fragmentary notation for geometrical proofs al-
ternative to, but not necessarily intrinsically inferior to, the “purely logical” notation of formal-
ized first order logic. […] They are intrinsic features of certain deductive methods. They are part 
of the semantics of logical reasoning, not only of its psychology or its heuristics. If it is suggested 
that heuristic ways of thinking are needed to make mathematical reasoning intuitive, I will borrow 
a line from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 6.233 and say that in this case the language (notation) itself 
provides the intuitions. (Hintikka, 1997, p. 73) 
 Moreover, in the case of human performances, in many forms of deductive 
reasoning there are not trivial and mechanical methods of making inferences but we 
have to use “models” and “heuristic procedures” that refer to a whole set of strategic 
principles. All the more reason that Bringsjord (1998) stresses his attention on the role 
played by a kind of “model based deduction” that is “part and parcel” of our establis-
hing Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem, showing the model-based character of this 
great abductive achievement of formal thought.5  
3. External and Internal Representations  
3.1. Logic Programs as Agents: External Observations and Internal Knowledge Assimilation  
It is in the area of distributed cognition that the importance of the interplay between in-
ternal and external representations has recently acquired importance (cf. for example 
Clark, 2003, and Hutchins, 1995). This perspective is particularly coherent with the so-
called agent-based framework (Magnani, 2006a). It is interesting to note that a clear 
attention to the agent-based nature of cognition and to its interplay between internal 
and external aspects can also be found in the area of logic programming, which Alis-
eda describes as one of the two main ways —we already said that the other is the se-
mantic tableaux method— of logically and computationally deal with abduction.  
I think in logic programming a new idea of logic —contrasted with the classical 
one— arises, which certainly opens to abduction the door that grants access to its full 
treatment through logical systems. Indeed, logic programs can be seen in an agent-
centered, computationally-oriented and purely syntactic perspective. Already in 1994 
Kowalski (1994) in “Logic without model theory” introduced a knowledge assimila-
tion framework for rational abductive agents, to deal with incomplete information and 
limited computational capacity.  
                                                     
5 Many interesting relationships between model-based reasoning in creative settings and the related possi-
ble deductive “dynamic” logical models are analyzed in Meheus (1999) and Meheus and Batens 
(2006). Dynamic logic is also related to the formal treatment of inconsistencies. 
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“Knowledge assimilation” is the assimilation of new information into a knowledge 
base, “as an alternative understanding of the way in which a knowledge base formu-
lated in logic relates to externally generated input sentences that describe experience”. 
The new pragmatic approach is based on a proof-theoretic assimilation of observa-
tional sentences into a knowledge base of sentences formulated in a language such as 
CL.6 Kowalski proposes a pragmatic alternative view that contrasts with the model-
theoretic approach to logic. In model theory notions such as interpretation and semantic 
structures dominate and are informed by the philosophical assumption that experience 
is caused by an independent existing “reality composed of individuals, functions and 
relations, separate from the syntax of language.” 
On the contrary logic programs can be seen as agents endowed with deductive da-
tabases considered —Kowalski says— as “theory presentations” from which logical 
consequences are derived, both in order to internally solve problems with the help of 
theoretical sentences and in order to assimilate new information from the external world of 
observations (observational sentences). The part of the knowledge base, which includes 
observational sentences and the theoretical sentences that are used to derive conclu-
sions that can be compared with observations sentences, is called world model, consid-
ered a completely syntactic concept: “World models are tested by comparing the con-
clusions that can be derived from them with other sentences that record inputs, which 
are observational sentences extracted —assimilated— from experience”. The agent 
might generate outputs —that are generated by some plan formation process in the 
context of the agent’s “resident goals”— which affect its environment and which of 
course can affect its own and other agents’ future inputs. Kowalski concludes “The 
agent will record the output, predict its expected effect on the environment using the 
‘world model’ and compare its expectations against its later observations.” 
I think the epistemological consequence of this approach is fundamental, also to 
understand the philosophical perspective of Aliseda’s book: in model theory truth is a 
static correspondence between sentences and a given state of the world. In Kowalski’s 
computational and “pragmatic” theory, the important is not the correspondence be-
tween language and experience, but the appropriate assimilation of an inevitable and 
continuous flowing input stream of “external” observational sentences into an ever 
changing “internal” knowledge base (of course the fact that computational resources 
available are bounded suggests to the agent to make the best use of them, for instance 
avoiding redundant and irrelevant derivation of consequences). The correspondence 
(we can say the “mirroring”) between an input sentence and a sentence that can be 
derived from the knowledge base is considered by Kowalski only a limiting case. Of 
course the agent might also generate its own hypothetical inputs, as in the case of ab-
duction, induction, and theory formation.  
Aliseda seems to acknowledge this fact and further improves this perspective. The 
task is accomplished with the help of the semantic tableaux framework which can 
control in several ways various and meaningful logical and computational abductive 
                                                     
6 CL, computational logic, refers to the computational approach to logic that has proved to be fruitful for 
creating non–trivial applications in computing, artificial intelligence, and law. 
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strategies, some of them reflecting types of abducing already present in “actual” hu-
man performances: “That is, we must provide the automatic procedures to operate a 
logic, its control strategy, and its procedures to acquire new information without dis-
turbing its coherence and hopefully achieve some learning in the end” (2006, p. 23). It 
is important to stress that thanks to the new Aliseda’s book the fact that in the logic of 
abduction the sensitivity to the growth of information [and the suitable extension of 
logical language] is definitely considered fundamental for the whole logic itself. Her 
analogy with the non-Euclidean revolution is striking and conclusive: “Whether non 
classical modes of reasoning are really logical is like asking if non-Euclidean geome-
tries are really geometries” (2006, p. 92). We know that that discovery represented an 
irreversible extension of geometry and mathematics beyond the restricted “intuitive” 
areas of the elementary perspectives.  
The conceptual framework above, that is derived from a computationally-oriented 
logic approach that strongly contrasts with the traditional one in terms of model the-
ory, is extremely interesting. It stresses the attention on the flowing interplay between 
internal and external representations/statements, so epistemologically establishing the 
importance of the agent-based character of cognition and so of “logical” cognition. In 
the recent cognitive science approach in terms of “distributed cognition” this perspec-
tive is convenient also for depicting actual human beings’ cognition so far as we are 
interested in studying its essential distributed dynamics.  
3.2. Distributed Cognition in Organic Agents: External and Internal Representations  
Mind is limited, both from a computational and an informational point of view: the 
act of delegating some aspects of cognition becomes necessary. It is in this sense that 
we can say that cognition is essentially multimodal.7 In addition, we can say that, adopt-
ing this perspective, we can give an account of the complexity of the whole human 
cognitive systems as the result of a complex interplay and coevolution of states of mind, 
body, and external environments suitably endowed with cognitive (in the cases illus-
trated in this commentary “logical”) significance. The “agent-based” view I have illus-
trated in the previous subsection aims at analyzing the features of “real” human think-
ing agents and “ideal” logical agents by recognizing the fact that a being-like-us agent 
functions “at two levels” and “in two ways”. I define the two levels as explicit and im-
plicit thinking. Agent-based perspective in logic has the power of recognizing the impor-
tance of both levels. 
 We maintain that representations are external and internal. We can say that  
                                                     
7 Thagard (2005, 2006) observes, that abductive inference can be visual as well as verbal, and conse-
quently acknowledges the sentential, model–based, and manipulative nature of abduction I have illus-
trated in my book (Magnani, 2001). Moreover, both data and hypotheses can be visually represented: 
“For example, when I see a scratch along the side of my car, I can generate the mental image of gro-
cery cart sliding into the car and producing the scratch. In this case both the target (the scratch) and 
the hypothesis (the collision) are visually represented. [...] It is an interesting question whether hy-
potheses can be represented using all sensory modalities. For vision the answer is obvious, as images 
and diagrams can clearly be used to represent events and structures that have causal effects (2006).” 
Indeed hypotheses can be also represented using other sensory modalities. 
Logic and Abduction: Cognitive Externalizations in Demonstrative Environments 281 
– external representations are formed by external materials that re-express (through 
reification) concepts and problems that are already present in the mind or con-
cepts and problems that do not have a natural home in the brain; 
– internalized representations are internal re-projections, a kind of recapitulations, 
(learning) of external representations in terms of neural patterns of activation in 
the brain. They can sometimes be “internally” manipulated like external objects 
and can originate new internal reconstructed representations through the neural 
activity of transformation and integration.  
3.3. Internal, External, and Hybrid Inducers and Abducers: External Semiotic Anchors 
In the following I will illustrate some features of this extraordinary interplay between 
human brains and the ideal cognitive systems they make, and so ideal logical (and compu-
tational) agents. We acknowledge that material artifacts like for example inductive and 
abductive logical and computational agents are tools for thoughts as is language: tools for 
exploring, expanding, and manipulating our own minds. A novel perspective on ex-
ternal ideal logical agents can be envisaged.  
Human beings spontaneously (and also animals, like already Peirce maintained) 
perform more or less rudimentary abductive and inductive reasoning. Starting from 
the low-level “in-formal” inferential performances like for example hasty generaliza-
tion or simple abductive diagnoses, widespread in children and adult humans, that 
certainly can represent a strategic success (for instance survival) and a cognitive failure 
(they are not truth-preserving, and so epistemologically unsatisfactory) human beings 
arrived to the externalization of “theoretical” inductive and abductive agents as ideal 
agents, logical and computational, like the ones Aliseda illustrates in her book. It is in 
this way that merely successful strategies are replaced with successful strategies that also tell the 
“more precise truth” about things. These external representations can be usefully re-
represented in our brains (if this is useful, simple, and possible), and they can originate 
new improved organic (mentally internal) ways of inferring or suitably exploited in a 
hybrid manipulative interplay, as I have already said above. In summary, we can copy 
(“recapitulating” them through internalization) ways of reasoning (or fragments of 
them) from some aspects of what we have externalized over there, in the external 
environment, for instance in “ideal” logical systems/agents. 
From this perspective human beings are hardwired for survival and for truth alike so best 
inductive and abductive strategies can be built and made explicit, through self-correction 
and re-consideration (a process that is at play at least since for example the time of the 
“ideal” inductive Mill’s methods). Furthermore, human beings are agents that can cogni-
tively behave as hybrid agents that exploit in reasoning both internal representations and 
externalized logical representations and tools, but also the mixture of the two.  
Let’s consider the example of the externalization of some inferential skills in logical 
demonstrative systems, like for example the ones that are at the basis of logic pro-
gramming and semantic tableaux, both illustrated and improved by Aliseda. They pre-
sent interesting cognitive features (cf. also Longo, 2005) which I believe deserve to be 
further analyzed:  
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1. symbolic: they activate and semiotically “anchor” meanings in material communica-
tive and intersubjective mediators in the framework of the phylogenetic, ontoge-
netic, and cultural reality of the human being and its language. I have already said it 
can be hypothesized these logical agents originated in embodied cognition, ges-
tures, and manipulations of the environment we share with some mammals but 
also non mammal animals (cf. the case of the complicated monkeys’ knots, en-
dowed with implicit mathematical features, and pigeons’ categorization, as implicit 
concept formation, in Grialou, Longo, and Okada, 2005). 
2. abstract: they are based on a maximal independence regarding sensory modality; they 
strongly stabilize experience and common categorization. The maximality is espe-
cially important: it refers to their practical and historical invariance and stability;  
3. rigorous: the rigor of proofs is reached through a difficult practical experience. For 
instance, in the case of mathematics and logic, as the maximal place for “convinc-
ing and sharable” reasoning. Rigor lies in the stability of proofs and in the fact they 
can be iterated. Following this perspective mathematics is the best example of 
maximal stability and conceptual invariance. Logic is in turn a set of proof invari-
ants, a set of structures that are preserved from one proof to another or which are 
preserved by proof transformations. As the externalization and result of a distilled 
praxis, the praxis of proof, it is made of maximally stable regularities;  
4. I also say that a maximization of memorylessness8 “variably” characterizes demonstra-
tive reasoning. This is particularly tangible in the case of the vast idealization of 
classical logic and related approaches. The inferences described by classical logic 
do not yield sensitive information —so to say— about their real past life in human 
agents’ use, contrarily to the “conceptual” —narrative— descriptions of human in-
formal non-demonstrative processes, which variously involve “historical”, “contex-
tual”, and “heuristic” memories. Indeed many informal thinking behaviors in hu-
man agents —for examples abductive inferences, especially in their generative 
part— are context-dependent. As already noted their stories vary with the multiple 
propositional relations the human agent finds in his/her environment and which 
he/she is able to take into account, and with various cognitive reasons to change 
his/her mind or to think in a different way, and with multiple motivations to de-
ploy various tactics of argument.  
In this perspective Gabbay and Woods say:  
Good reasoning is always good in relation to a goal or an agenda which may be tacit. [...] Reason-
ing validly is never itself a goal of good reasoning; otherwise one could always achieve it simply 
by repeating a premiss as conclusion, or by entering a new premiss that contradicts one already 
present. [...] It is that the reasoning actually performed by individual agents is sufficiently reliable 
not to kill them. It is reasoning that precludes neither security not prosperity. This is a fact of 
fundamental importance. It helps establish the fallibilist position that it is not unreasonable to 
pursue modes of reasoning that are known to be imperfect. (Gabbay and Woods 2005, pp. 19-20)  
                                                     
8 I derive this expression from Leyton (2001) that introduces a very interesting new geometry where 
forms are no longer memoryless like in classical approaches such as the Euclidean and the Kleinian in 
terms of groups of transformations 
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 Human agents, as practical agents, are hasty inducers and abducers and bad predictors, 
unlike ideal (logical and computational) agents. In conclusion, we can say informal 
abductive inferences in human agents have a memory, a story: consequently, an abduc-
tive ideal logical agent which formalizes those human skills has to variably weaken many 
of the aspects of classical logic and to overcome the relative demonstrative limitations.  
I think that a great contribution given to logic by Aliseda is the improvement of 
the semantic tableaux method (and its application to the logic of abduction and to the 
enhancement of other logical models of abduction, like for example the belief-revision 
framework). The new extended semantic tableaux method fulfills the request of 
“weakening” the rigidity of classical logic but also of many non standard logics strictly 
related to it, helping to further open the new era of logic: the attention to the role of 
meta-levels —for instance in the logic of abduction— formalizes the flexibility and “his-
toricity” of many kinds of human thinking which are meaningful in certain application 
areas they address.  
Aliseda’s conclusion is clear, and by implicitly reflecting the four aspects I have just 
illustrated, also leads not only to a new perspective on abduction but also to a new 
conception of logic:  
The various types of abductive explanatory styles in a larger universe of other deductive and in-
ductive systems of logic naturally commit us to a global view of logic […] in which there is a va-
riety of logical systems which rather than competing and being rival to each other, they are com-
plementary in that each of them has a specific notion of validity corresponding to an extra-
systemic one and a rigorous way for validating arguments, for it makes sense to speak of a logical 
system as correct or incorrect, having several of them. And finally, the global view states for ab-
duction that it must aspire to global application, irrespective of subject matter, and thus found in 
scientific reasoning and in common sense reasoning alike. (2006, p. 89) 
 We can conclude by stressing the fact that human informal non-demonstrative 
inferential process of abduction (and of induction) is more and more externalized and 
objectified —and Aliseda contributes to this extension— at least in three ways:  
1. through Turing’s Universal Practical Computing Machines we can have running pro-
grams —often based on logic, that are able to mimic —and enhance— “the actions 
of a human computer very closely” (Turing 1950), and so —amazingly— also those 
human agents’ “actions” that correspond to the complicated inferential perform-
ances like abduction (cf. the whole area of artificial intelligence);  
2. human non-demonstrative processes are more and more externalized and made 
available in forms of explicit narratives and learnable templates of behavior (cf. also 
the study of fallacies as important tools of that human “kit” that provides evolution-
ary advantages, in this sense any fallacy of the affirming the consequent —which de-
picts abduction in classical logic— “can” be better than nothing (Woods, 2004).9 
3. new “demonstrative” systems —ideal logical agents— are created able to model 
and make rigorous in a deductive way many non-demonstrative thinking processes, 
like abduction, analogy, creativity, spatial and visual reasoning, etc. 
                                                     
9 Cf. also Gabbay and Woods (2005, pp. 33-36). 
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